A: No compliance with the law was had by the court, and no investigation into Mrs. Dr. Smith’s sexual abuse allegation was allowed.
So much for the judiciary professing to act “in the best interest of the child.”
It’s no wonder that the mothers who responded to the website I posted for my daughter’s 18th birthday (no longer posted) said they believed the judiciary were the biggest abusers of their children!
A: I filed motions noting hearings before Art. 4, Sec. 6, judges of the superior court.
In fact, I filed a plethora of motions asking for evidence of the Art. 4, Sec. 6, superior court order modifying the custody provisions in my 1983 Decree of Dissolution. Because no such order exists, these motions were ignored and denied by the court without comment.
A: No. They refused to hear the motions and remanded the motions back to family law commissioners.
A: On April 24, 1992, FLC Velatequi—the same FLC who unlawfully entered the February 17, 1989 temporary order awarding Don temporary custody—declared that I was “too litigious” in my attempts to gain access to my children. FLC Velatequi declared that I was entitled to no parental rights—including access to Doni’s medical records—because I had been afforded no parental rights under FLC DuBuque’s December 30, 1988 Order of Default. When I argued that FLC DuBuque’s December 30, 1988 Order of Default was not a lawful termination of parental rights and that it had been ruled an unconstitutional order both by the superior court and the appellate courts, FLC Velatequi stated that it was too late for me to complain about “that problem.” When I argued that FLC DuBuque had ordered the submission of parenting plans and therefore my parental rights could not have been terminated as he was concluding, FLC Velatequi refused to acknowledge that this order even existed.
As punishment for being too litigious, FLC Velatequi barred my access to the Art. 4, Sec. 6, superior court relative to all my family related rights.
When I claim that my access to the Art. 4, Sec. 6, superior court relative to all of my parental rights was barred that is exactly what I mean. FLC Velatequi’s order instructed the clerk of the court not to accept for filing any motions, pleadings, or other paperwork submitted by me relative to my family related rights. Before the hearing ended, I asked for clarification of Dr. David Smith’s February and March 1991 affidavits in light of what Smith stated in his April 17, 1992 certified letter to me. FLC Velatequi refused to address the matter.
When I continued to challenge his decision to bar my access to the Art. 4, Sec. 6, superior court, FLC Velatequi maintained that his barring of my access to the superior court relative to all my family-related rights was constitutional, though he cited no case law or constitutional provision in support of his conclusion.
The definitive law on this issue exists in a plethora of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Those decisions have decreed that state courts cannot deny a person access to the court in matters related to family rights and that state courts must establish a countervailing interest or legitimate end prior to interfering with parental rights. In Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Svcs., 452 US 18, 68 L.Ed 2d 640, 101 S.CT. 2153, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in part, that its “decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent’s desire for and right to the “companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children” is an important interest that “undeniably warrants deference” by the courts.
FLC Velatequi stated that he found the law to be “merely interesting,” (his words) but nothing needing to be complied with.
